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Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) claim to provide the first causal estimates of the effects
of fetal stress exposure on mental health later in life. They emphasize that their analysis
is the first to address non-random exposure to a relative’s death and the endogeneity of
gestation length to fetal stress. In light of discoveries regarding prior literature, we find
these claims to be exaggerated and misleading.
1 Introduction
Have Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) discovered a novel causal effect of in utero maternal
stress from family ruptures on the later life and health outcomes of children? The authors claim
two substantive contributions relative to prior literature on the same topic: The authors’ first
claim of innovation is that they use mothers who experienced a post-natal death as a control
group to compare with the treatment group of mothers who experienced a relative’s death with
a baby in utero. The second claimed novel contribution is that the authors instrument for actual
gestation length with predicted gestation length. Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) claim that
these two innovations enable them to recover—for the first time—the causal effect of family
ruptures on later life outcomes. In this note, we demonstrate that both claims of novelty are
false. Further, the paper’s acceptance by the American Economic Review (AER), even after
the earlier literature was brought to light, was potentially enabled by an editor who is Rossin-
Slater’s co-author on another work in progress.
Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) are not the first to use exposure to maternal bereavement
in utero for identification nor are they the first to establish a causal link between fetal stress
exposure and mental health.1 In fact, a large literature, starting with Huttunen and Niskanen
∗This note sythesizes the critiques of several anonymous economists. Email: nicolas.bearbaki@gmail.com.
1In May 2016, after their paper (Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2016a) was accepted at the AER, Persson and
Rossin-Slater added two footnotes: footnote 7 and footnote 10. These footnotes purport to address additional
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(1978), uses the same control group as Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) to identify the effect
of fetal stress exposure on mental health.2 Much of the literature invokes the same argument
as Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016a, 2016b), by letting the effect of a relative’s death vary
with the timing of that death. For example, Abel et al. (2014) estimate models which allow the
effect of bereavement to vary in categories ranging from preconception to well into childhood.3
Using the reasoning in Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) paper, we must conclude that these
earlier papers had also recovered causal effects (whether or not that is explicitly claimed by the
earlier authors in the same language used by economists).
Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) second claim to innovation is an instrument that turns
out to be irrelevant to their estimates, as expressed in more detail by Matsumoto (2016) and
summarized in Section 3.
2 Econometric Specification
Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) empirical strategy is not novel, despite the authors’ and
their editor’s claims. Huttunen and Niskanen (1978) used the same control and treatment
groups and also compared in utero exposure to post-natal exposure. The only major differ-
ence in empirical strategy is Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) instrumental variable (IV)
method—described in detail in Section 3—which does not affect the estimates.
Another earlier work, Abel et al. (2014), offers estimates that are not explicitly placed in
the treatment-control framework, but from which we can read off a variety of causal effects.
For example, Abel et al.’s (2014) Table 3 reports that any pre-natal exposure has an odds ratio
of 1.29 for psychosis, relative to no-exposure, and 1.45 for post-natal exposure. The difference
in odds ratios, or some transformation thereof, is an estimate of the same causal effects as in
Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b).
Although Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) claim to have done the first “causal” analysis,
in fact Abel et al. (2014) and other papers in the medical literature permit far more detailed
“causal” analyses than Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b), because the latter restrict their anal-
ysis to binary treatments. There are sound biological reasons for the effect to vary with the
timing of the relative’s death even in utero (as described in Class et al. (2014), which allows
the effect to vary by month of pregnancy).
literature not cited in the April 2016 draft of Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016a) which was the version that was
accepted for publication. For further information, see retractionwatch.com/2016/05/26/economists-go-wild-over-
overlooked-citations-in-preprint-on-prenatal-stress/. Despite these additions, Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b)
do not appear to have been subjected to a further round of refereeing as might have been expected following the
revelation of several closely related contributions.
2It is important to realize that the public health literature on the topic has been growing steadily since the late
1970s. Class et al. (2011), who use the same dataset as Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) to address similar
questions, review that literature.
3Abel et al. (2014) also stratify by cause of relative’s death, which is another of Persson and Rossin-Slater’s
(2016b) minor claims of innovation.
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More formally, let d1 indicate a relative’s death in utero and d2 denote a relative’s death
within 280 days after conception. Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) note correctly that a
regression of some mental health outcome y on d1 and observable controls does not recover a
consistent estimate of the effect of exposure to a relative’s death during pregnancy. Persson and
Rossin-Slater (2016b) leave the impression that the putatively “correlational” medical literature
limits attention to this specification, but that is incorrect.
Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) proceed by estimating Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
models of the form
y= β0 +β1d1 +X ′δ +u
in the subpopulation for which either d1 or d2 has occurred. They argue that, “intuitively, our
empirical strategy exploits a discontinuity around the threshold of 280 days after conception,
and assigns a child to intrauterine stress exposure if the relatives death occurred before this
date.”
Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) are mistaken. This is not a standard regression disconti-
nuity design. An estimate of β1 from the specification above should asymptotically lead to the
same estimate of θ1−θ2 from the specification
y= θ0 +θ1d1 +θ2d2 +X ′γ+ e
estimated over the entire population. Both models rely on regression adjustment for X and a
difference in means across the pre- and post-partum outcomes in order to identify the effect
of exposure in utero. The argument is essentially that θ1 and θ2 are biased but by the same
magnitude, so the difference θ1−θ2 is an unbiased estimate of the effect of a relative’s death
in utero relative to post-partum.
Note that the odd ratios in Abel et al. (2014), suitably transformed, can also serve as an
estimate of both β1 and θ1− θ2. In essence, Huttunen and Niskanen (1978) and Abel et al.
(2014) both use the same approach to identify the “causal” effect as Persson and Rossin-Slater
(2016b). Thus Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) first claim to novelty is unwarranted.
3 Endogeneity in the Medical Literature
Can Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) claim an original contribution to the literature based on
their introduction of an instrumental variable? In this section, we highlight concerns regarding
the IV method used in Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b).4 In order to make a claim to an
original contribution to the literature, Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) argue that date of
birth is endogenous, and that consequently the prior research results in the medical literature
(for example, Huttunen and Niskanen (1978) and Class et al. (2011)) are not “causal.” To
4Matsumoto (2016) discusses these issues in greater depth.
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address the supposed endogeneity problem, Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) instrument date
of birth with the expected delivery date.
Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016b) present in their Appendix D the estimation results of a
two-stage least squares regression (Table D1). They report a first stage R2 of 0.97, and they
mention that “the instrument (relative death before expected birth date) is different from the
actual exposure variable (relative death before actual birth date) for only about 1 percent of the
individuals in our data” (p. D-25).
What this suggests is that the endogeneity they are supposedly correcting for is not an
important issue. Because of the high degree of similarity between the potentially endogenous
variable and the instrument, they should get almost the same result from the naive comparison
using actual birth date, just as Huttunen and Niskanen (1978) did. While Persson and Rossin-
Slater (2016b) dismiss these previous scholars’ findings as merely “correlational,” they fail to
demonstrate that their own estimates are different from those earlier findings.
In fact, the opposite is likely to be true: Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) instrumental
variable is the same as their “endogenous” variable for 99% of their data. In other words,
using the same assumptions that make their instrumental variable design valid, the simple OLS
estimate is unlikely to be biased.
Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) IV method offers no improvement over the approach
used in the medical literature.5 Thus Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) second claim to an
original contribution to the literature is also unwarranted.
4 Discussion
Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) paper incorrectly dismisses the previous literature and
misrepresents their own paper’s claims to novelty. We recognize that scholars may occasion-
ally fail to locate and cite previous literature. However, the case of Persson and Rossin-Slater
(2016b) is very concerning: even after they were made aware of their oversight of earlier liter-
ature, they have still refused to honestly situate their work in the context of the larger literature.
Instead, they incorrectly demean the work of previous scholars as merely “correlational,” and
falsely attribute novelty to their own work that it does not deserve.
This point is particularly disturbing because Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) claims
to novelty are publicly supported by Hilary Hoynes, the co-editor at the AER in charge of the
5In addition, it is unclear whether Persson and Rossin-Slater’s (2016b) instrument is truly exogenous. The
expected delivery date is calculated based on the gestational age of the baby at birth (conception date equals
birth date minus gestational age, while expected delivery date equals conception date plus 280 days). However,
the gestational age is itself an estimate based on the last menstrual cycle or measurements taken from a prenatal
ultrasound. The prenatal ultrasound is the preferred method for estimating gestational age and is used if it gives a
significantly different answer from the estimate using the last menstrual cycle. If pregnant individuals happen to
miss early prenatal appointments because say a close relative dies, then the estimate of gestational age is affected
and the estimated date of birth is not exogenous.
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paper. Even more concerning is that Hoynes is a recent co-author with Maya Rossin-Slater.6,7
This situation violates the editorial policy of the AER: to limit conflicts of interest, the editorial
policy does not allow an editor to be in charge of their recent co-author’s paper.
Given the hierarchical nature of economics, a single publication in the American Economic
Review is enough to build a reputation as a leading researcher. It is no surprise that the impres-
sion that the top publications are sometimes handed out carelessly to friends and relations is
disturbing to many. It is also no surprise that few are willing to publicly criticize those who
control access to the leading journals in the discipline.
The culture of honest economic scholarship is threatened because the AER referees were not
asked to re-assess the paper’s contribution despite the new information that we have brought to
light in other venues. This is why we found it important to produce this note and help correctly
position this paper in the literature.
Appendix: A History of Events
A brief timeline of the events that transpired which motivated this note is as follows:
1. In an earlier accepted version of their AER paper, Persson and Rossin-Slater (2016a)
failed to cite the health literature relating maternal stress to health outcomes of children,
and instead falsely claimed a novel contribution.
2. When this came to light, instead of acknowledging the existing literature, Persson and
Rossin-Slater (2016b) added footnotes which significantly misrepresented the content of
said literature, and once again falsely claimed a novel contribution for themselves.
3. The revised paper (Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2016b) was apparently not sent back for a
new round of refereeing, and the changes were instead approved only at the sole discre-
tion of the assigned co-editor who may be exposed to conflict of interest.
4. A group of anonymous economists worked together to produce this note to clarify our
position on the matter. We do not know one another’s identities. We will not reveal our
identities to avoid retaliation from editors at AER and other members of their networks.
6See retractionwatch.com/2016/05/26/economists-go-wild-over-overlooked-citations-in-preprint-on-prenatal-
stress/. In particular, as this article reports, ”Hoynes confirmed to us that Persson and Rossin-Slater had contacted
her to ask if it was acceptable to revise the paper to include the Class et al. paper, a request which she granted and
described as not unusual. Until a manuscript has been published, she wrote, she accepts such changes.”
7See, for instance, sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/baileymj/research-and-publications.
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